Collusion Resistive Framework for Multimedia Security by Shukla, Deepak
Collusion Resistive Framework For
Multimedia Security
Deepak Shukla
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Collusion Resistive Framework For
Multimedia Security
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Master Of Technology
in
Computer Science and Engineering
by
Deepak Shukla
(Roll Number: 214CS2157)
based on research carried out
under the supervision of
Prof. Ruchira Naskar
May, 2016
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
National Institute of Technology Rourkela
Prof. Ruchira Naskar
Assistant Professor
May 10, 2016
Supervisor’s Certificate
This is to certify that the work presented in the dissertation entitled Collusion
Resistive Framework For Multimedia Security submitted by Deepak Shukla, Roll
Number 214CS2157, is a record of original research carried out by him under my supervision
and guidance in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree ofMaster Of Technology
in Department of Computer Science and Engineering. Neither this dissertation nor any part
of it has been submitted earlier for any degree or diploma to any institute or university in
India or abroad.
Ruchira Naskar
Dedication
Dedicated to my beloved parents and sisters …
Declaration of Originality
I, Deepak Shukla, Roll Number 214CS2157 hereby declare that this dissertation entitled
Collusion Resistive Framework For Multimedia Security presents my original work carried
out as a postgraduate student of NIT Rourkela and, to the best of my knowledge, contains
no material previously published or written by another person, nor any material presented
by me for the award of any degree or diploma of NIT Rourkela or any other institution. Any
contribution made to this research by others, with whom I have worked at NIT Rourkela or
elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the dissertation. Works of other authors cited in this
dissertation have been duly acknowledged under the sections “Reference” or “Bibliography”.
I have also submitted my original research records to the scrutiny committee for evaluation
of my dissertation.
I am fully aware that in case of any non-compliance detected in future, the Senate of NIT
Rourkela may withdraw the degree awarded to me on the basis of the present dissertation.
May 10, 2016
NIT Rourkela
Deepak Shukla
Acknowledgment
As a matter of first importance, I would need to express my true regard and thanks towards
my supervisor Dr. Ruchira Naskar, who has been the controlling light behind this work. I
need to recognize her for acquainting me with the energizing field of Multimedia Security
and giving me the chance to work under his direction. Her unified confidence in this point
and capacity to draw out the best of expository and down to earth abilities in individuals has
been priceless in intense periods. Without her priceless recommendations and ever prepared
help it wouldn’t have been feasible for me to finish this postulation. I am amazingly lucky
to have a opportunity to work nearby such a great individual.
I express my appreciation towards all the employees of the CSE Department for their
thoughtful collaboration.
When I glance back at my achievements in life, I can see a reasonable hint of my family’s
concerns and dedication all over the place. My dearest mother, whom I owe all that I have
accomplished and whatever I have turned into; my dearest father, for continually trusting in
me what’s more, moving me to think ambitiously even at the hardest snippets of my life; and
my sister who were forever my quiet backing amid every one of the hardships of this attempt
and past.
April 20, 2016
NIT Rourkela
Deepak Shukla
Roll Number: 214CS2157
Abstract
The recent advances in multimedia and Internet technology rises the need for multimedia
security. The frequent distribution of multimedia content can cause security breach and
violate copyright protection law. The legitimate user can come together to generate
illegitimate copy to use it for unintended purpose. The most effective such kind of attack is
collusion, involve group of user to contribute with their copies of content to generate a new
copy. Fingerprinting,a unique mark is embedded have one to one corresponds with user,
is the solution to tackle collusion attack problem. A colluder involve in collusion leaves its
trace in alter copy, so the effectiveness of mounting a successful attack lies in how effectively
a colluder alter the image by leaving minimum trace. A framework,step by step procedure to
tackle collusion attack, involves fingerprint generation and embedding. Various fingerprint
generation and embedding techniques are used to make collusion resistive framework
effective. Spread spectrum embedding with coded modulation is most effective framework
to tackle collusion attack problem. The spread spectrum framework shows high collusion
resistant and traceability but it can be attacked with some special collusion attack like
interleaving attack and combination of average attack. Various attacks have different post
effect on multimedia in different domains. The thesis provide a detail analysis of various
collusion attack in different domains which serve as basis for designing the framework to
resist collusion. Various statistical and experimental results are drawn to show the behavior
of collusion attack. The thesis also proposed a framework here uses modified ECC coded
fingerprint for generation and robust watermarking embedding usingwave atom. The system
shows high collusion resistance against various attack. Various experiments are are drawn
for the system to shows that the system is highly collusion resistance and have much better
performance than other existing literature system.
Keywords: Collusion Attack; Interleaving ECC Embedding; Wave atom; Multiple
description.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Collusion Resistant Framework (CRF) for multimedia ensure the copyright law for
multimedia content against the most popular collusion attack (CA). Copyright law include
rights for reproduction, communication, adaption and translation of work to the creator of
content. Framework enables the user to use the generated multimedia content in its intended
way as supposed by the copyrighter of content. It concern with the security of creator’s
copyright law, authenticity of content to distributor, genuineness of content to user.
Collusion Attack are become more feasible due to proliferation of digitized media and
remote access of user. Collusion Attack involves multiple user to use there legitimate copy
of digitized content and perform various static operation on these copies to generate the
new copy of content against the copyright law which can be used for illegitimate purpose.
Collusion attack are very efficient kind of attack and have too low back tracing rate for
colluder as each user contribute equal amount of effort in creation of illegitimate content.
Collusion attack can be avoided with the use of digital fingerprint for multimedia. Digital
fingerprint are embed as the information to the content which ensures the identity of user.
A digital fingerprint differs from watermark in such a way that fingerprint are embed as
the information related to user authenticity while watermark embed the information that
is independent of user. A digital watermark is same for various copies of digitized content
whereas fingerprint copies of various image is different for various user. So watermark lacks
the back tracing property for collusion attack because various colluder has same identical
copies can break watermark whereas fingerprint allow to trace up to colluder because each
colluder has a unique copy of digitized media.
CRF specifies a series of step to embed the fingerprint to digitized content to avoid the
CA. In this thesis, collusion resistant framework uses robust fingerprint embedding based on
wave atom transform and multiple description coding. The fingerprints generation fallows
ECC(Error correcting code) using Reed Solomon Code.
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1.1.1 Anatomy of Collusion Resistant Framework (CRF)
Collusion Resistant Framework defines series of step for multimedia content to avoid the
collusion attack on multimedia. It involves preprocessing of multimedia content to make it
suitable to embed the fingerprint, embedding of fingerprint, postprocessing the content to
convert it into fingerprinted image.
Preprocessing of multimedia content depends upon types of embedding used for
fingerprinting. It involves processing to make it compatible for embedding process.
Embedding of multimedia fingerprint involves operations between block of content and
fingerprint to produce fingerprinted blocks.
Postprocessing involves the combining the fingerprinted blocks in specified manner to
form the fingerprinted content.
Figure 1.1: Collusion Resistant Framework
Fig. 1.1 shows the pictorial representation for collusion resistant framework. It
shows the basic multimedia content is input to system which consist of series of step
namely preprocessing, embedding, postprocessing and output the fingerprinted content. The
framework assume that fingerprints to embed are present in advance which is input to the
embedding step.
Figure 1.2a , 1.2b shows the detailed description of block collusion resistant system.
Figure 1.2a shows the preprocessing block of CRF. The block take multimedia content as
input and gives preprocessed content as output which is suitable for embedding block. The
inner step of block mainly involves transform the content and dividing the blocks. The
transform domain and block formation depends upon type of embedding mechanism used
for the framework. Figure 1.2b shows the postprocessing block of framework. The block
takes embedded content as input and generates fingerprinted content as output. The inner
step are just reverse of the steps of postprocessing blocks. The steps involved combining of
the blocks to form as original segment and applying inverse transformation to revert back
the content to its original domain.
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(a) Preprocessing Block (b) Post processing Block
Figure 1.2: Blocks for Collusion Resistance Framework
1.1.2 Digital Fingerprinting Embedding
Embedding digital fingerprint involves encapsulation of fingerprint with multimedia.
Embedding fingerprint for multimedia must be robust in manner such that fingerprint can
not be removed easily for multimedia content otherwise it become very easy to generate the
illegitimate copy of content. Embedding mainly is mapping the generated fingerprints and
concatenating them with the transformed multimedia content.
Figure 1.3: Digital Fingerprint embedding
Figure 1.3 shows the block diagram for embedding the fingerprints for CRF. The
3
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embedding procedure takes preprocessed content generated in preprocessing block of CRF
as shown in fig 1.2a along with generated fingerprints. The fingerprints are mapped and
suitable operation are applied based on CRF to generate the embedded content.
Embedding Techniques
Embedding deals with the robustness of digitized media. The fingerprint embedded in the
media is robust from removal that is it can’t be isolated from media content otherwise
mounting of attack can be done easily. The first data embedding is spread spectrum
embedding. Another efficient embedding method which is used in this thesis is robust
embedding using wave atom.
Spread spectrum embedding is motivated from spread spectrum modulation technique
of signal transmission. Spread spectrum embedding consist of four step as fallow:-
• Selection of feature signal
• Generation of Watermark signal
• Add watermark to feature signal
• Replace Original Feature signal with watermarked one.
Robust Embedding UsingWave Atom uses multiple description coding and wave atom
transform. Robust Embedding is as fallow:-
• Make description based on multiple description coding.
• Apply the wave atom transform to the description.
• Select embedding coefficient
• Embedding the coefficient.
• Apply reverse wave atom transform.
• Add the description to form original image.
A detailed description for Robust Embedding Using Wave atom is given in Chapter 4.
1.2 Digital Fingerprinting for Multimedia
Digital fingerprinting (DF) of multimedia involves embedding the piece of information
which uniquely identify the user of media to which it is distributed. Fingerprints differs
fromwatermark in a such way that watermark provide genuineness of media content whereas
fingerprint provides authenticity for legitimate user.
4
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1.2.1 Issue Related to Digital Fingerprint
DF for multimedia provide legitimacy to user so also faces some issue. The most common
issue is to withstand against the removal of fingerprints another is uniqueness for user.
Robustness of DF involve that it cannot be removed from digital media. The more
robust is the fingerprint more is the efficiency of fingerprint. Robustness of digital media is
achieved by various data embedding method.
Uniqueness implies uniquely identify the user. Fingerprinted generated for the particular
user is only correspond to that user. The uniqueness ensures traceability for DF. If a colluder
involves in trespassing with its own copy of legitimate media then it leaves some trace in
colluded copy which is unique, leads to traceability for that colluder.
Dimension Dependency implies that DF can be generated from user is limited to
dimension of code used for generation. So for high number of user the fingerprints must
have high dimension. This problem generally occurs for code with no correlation between
the fingerprints which can be avoided by adding some means of correlation between the
fingerprint.
1.2.2 Fingerprinting Techniques
Fingerprinting Techniques
Fingerprinting deals with generation of uniquely user identifiable fingerprint. The two
most widely used fingerprinting mechanism are orthogonal fingerprinting and coded
fingerprinting.
Orthogonal Fingerprinting-has stems from orthogonal modulation for signal
transmission. It enables watermark to be mutually orthogonal in nature. The orthogonality
can be achieved by pseudo random number generator which can generates mutually
independent watermark. The orthogonal nature of these watermark allows difference in
pattern for multiple user. Orthogonal fingerprint has significantly simple mechanism for
embedding and encoding but independency of fingerprint comes at price, it has some
drawback:-
• Limited to small group of user.
• Complexity of Detection /traceability is too high
• On linear attack energy reduction is directly dependent upon number of user.
• Fingerprint generation is limited to dimension of fingerprint.
Coded Fingerprinting-uses code modulation technique to construct the fingerprint.
Code modulation overcome the drawback of energy reduction and dimensionality limitation.
The energy reduction introduced by collusion can be overcome with the correlation so
5
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that positively correlated coefficient of fingerprint do not experience reduction in energy.
Correlation can also leads to dependence thus overcome the dimensionality limitation.
Coded Fingerprints can be generated in fallowing manner:-
• Base Code Formation-to ensure the correlation.
• Combining the base code with the outer code-to avoid dimensionality limitation.
Figure 1.4: Coded Digital Fingerprint
Figure 1.4 gives the scenario for generating the coded fingerprints. It shows the base
code generation involve the basic procedure for code generation and depends upon scheme
used for coded modulation. The next step in sequence of generation is resizing implies
mainly enlargement of base code to match the block dimension of multimedia segment. Next
step involve mapping the enlarged code with the predefined code fallowed by arranging the
code in sequence to generate the fingerprint.
A detailed description for Coded Fingerprinting is given in Chapter 4.
1.3 Research Motivation
Multimedia Fingerprinting is the core of collusion resistant framework which provide
copyright protection and digital right management for the multimedia content. The
multimedia fingerprinting can be either independent or correlated that is orthogonal or coded
fingerprinting, but has to provide efficient solution to problem of collusion attack. The
motivation for this can be listed as fallow:-
• The motive is to model the collusion attack problem such that both image processing
attack and collusion attack are taken into account. Also the threshold can be increased
for colluder so that optimal solution can be found.
• The problem if solved using orthogonal modulation has drawback of dimension
limitation is that the number of user is limited to the dimension of fingerprint. Thus the
coded modulation used with robust embedding method in order to provide the solution
to the collusion attack problem.
6
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• In real world scenario, the attacker mount collusion attack in different domain
(embedding and nonembedding) and also image processing attack. So both efficient
fingerprinting and embedding approach must be taken into consideration in order to
form optimal solution for collusion resistant framework.
1.4 Problem statement
Collusion attack problem is solved by many researchers. Some has found solution with
independent fingerprinting techniques and some with coded fingerprinting techniques with
spread spectrum embedding . The primary objective of this research is to provide efficient
CRF which is achieved here by providing collusion resistant framework that uses coded
fingerprinting with wave atom robust embedding This can be elaborated as fallow:-
• The aim is to use suitable fingerprinting mechanism which intern provide high
collusion resistant against the colluder along with the fact that uniqueness property
must not be violated. The fingerprinting mechanism must also support the large
number of user for system. This leads to find the collusion resistant system
with suitable fingerprinting mechanism that provide uniqueness, dimensional
independency.
• The orthogonal fingerprinting provide uniqueness to system but suffer with
dimensional dependency problem so coded fingerprinting are suitable for high number
of user. But the simple AND coded fingerprint can be attacked with collusion attack so
more efficient coded fingerprint mechanism must be used for optimal system solution.
• The embedding mechanism that are currently in use provide high embedding time
for fingerprint so the use of less computational complex mechanism but more secure
embedding mechanism require in order to provide optimal system solution.
The design of optimal collusion resistant framework can be achieved by taking fallowing
constraints into consideration:
• Fingerprinting Mechanism deals with the factor like dimension of fingerprint,
number of user. The fingerprints that generates must unique for the system and must
not limit with the dimension of code leads to optimal solution.
• Embedding Mechanism deals with encapsulation of fingerprinting with the digital
content. The strong is the encapsulation more efficient is the embedding mechanism
more optimal is the system.
• Traceability Mechanism comes in picture after the mounting of the attack. This
mechanism deals with the finding the colluder that involves in the collusion. The
7
traceabilitymechanism directly dependent upon the types of fingerprintingmechanism
used in the system.
1.5 Research Contributions
The research contributes mainly to provide optimal solution to resist the collusion attack
problem . The main contribution of thesis is given as fallow:-
• Analysis of various kind of attack that can be mount on the multimedia and
provide a statistical measure for different kind of attack in different embedding and
non-embedding domain. The analysis of various kind of attack will be helpful in
designing the optimal collusion resistant framework.
• The design of efficient collusion resistant framework by providing a novel approach
for fingerprint generation and embedding of fingerprint to multimedia. The approach
used here uses coded fingerprinting along with robust embedding.
1.6 Thesis Organization
This chapter gives a brief overview of collusion resistive framework. Discussion fallowed
digital fingerprinting in multimedia along with techniques and issues related to it.
Chapter 2: A detailed overview for framework is given. The chapter discuss various
literature techniques and problem statement is formulated.
Chapter 3: A comparative analysis of various collusion attack on multimedia for coded
fingerprint in different domain is given. Chapter discuss the attack model from owner and
colluder point of view. Statistical results are drawn for the collusion attack in different
domains.
Chapter 4: A detailed description for proposed collusion resistive framework is given.
Chapter also discuss the system design process and various simulation parameter.
Chapter 5: Experimental results are drawn for collusion attack in different domains and
proposed collusion resistive framework.
Chapter 6: Conclusion for our proposed scheme is given along with future work.
Chapter 1 Introduction
.
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Chapter 2
Background and Problem Formulation
2.1 Introduction
Fingerprint generation and embedding are two main building block of optimal collusion
resistant system. Fingerprint embedding involves mainly two techniques independent
fingerprinting and coded fingerprinting. The independent fingerprint shows high uniqueness
whereas cause the problem of dimensional dependency. The orthogonal fingerprint mainly
used where number of user are too less are require significant uniqueness and also orthogonal
fingerprint are susceptible to collusion attack. Wu et al.[1] given a scenario which shows that
fingerprints generated using orthogonal modulation are susceptible to linear combination of
collusion attack.
The framework that resist collusion using coded modulation shows more resistibility
against the collusion attack. The coded fingerprint techniques generates fingerprint that have
some correlation and eliminate the problem of dimensional dependency. In this chapter a
detail overview for collusion resistant system is given, also discussion of various collusion
resistance system are presented as literature survey. Also various measure are given for
collusion resistant system.
2.2 Collusion Resistant System for Multimedia
Fingerprinted content generation mainly involves host signal, collusion resistant system and
output fingerprinted multimedia content. A collusion resistant system mainly concatenate
fingerprints with host signal. So basically a collusion resistant system is input output system
with host signal as input and fingerprinted copies for multiple user as output.
The main aim of fingerprint generation and embedding is to trace back the user which
illegally distribute the content against copyright law. The fingerprint generation precedes
with some assumption. Orthogonal modulation are based on marking assumption. A
orthogonal fingerprint is collection of mark whereas mark is position. The marks are of
two types detectable and undetectable. The assumption based on that undetectable mark
enchantment leads to meaningless object. So if undetectable mark is changed this will leads
10
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to illegitimate user.
(a) Fingerprinted Content Generation (b) Detailed Collusion Resistant System
Figure 2.1: Collusion Resistive Process
Fingerprinted content generation shown in figure 2.1a 2.1b. A basic block diagram for
fingerprinted content generation is shown in Fig. 2.1a. The multimedia content is shown as
input to the CRS to generate the fingerprinted content shown as output from the CRS. The
basic fingerprinted generation process has three component multimedia content, collusion
resistant system and generated fingerprinted content.
Fig. 2.1b shows the detail of collusion resistant system(CRS) along with various
component of fingerprint content generation. A CRS has mainly two component
fingerprint embedding and fingerprints. Various Fingerprints generated for multiple user
and multimedia content are input to fingerprint embedding. The embedding block mainly
concatenate or map the fingerprint with host signal to generate fingerprinted copy,unique to
every user, depending upon scheme.
2.3 Literary Survey
Collusion Resistant fingerprinting for multimedia is very trendy topic in image processing
and many researches are carried out to generate the fingerprint to avoid collusion attack.
Various researcher proposed various techniques and framework in order to avoid the
collusion attack for multimedia.
Boneh et al. [2] first of all presents a digital fingerprints that can avoid collusion attack.
The aim of this work is to give details of code modulation techniques for digital fingerprints.
The fingerprinting based onmarking and generate unique fingerprint for each of user. Trappe
11
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et al. [3] provide a mechanism which uses binary anti collusion code(ACC). The tracing
capability of ACC depends upon number of code generated that are uniquely overlapped that
the code can trace up only that user for which generated code is uniquely overlapped. Cox et
al. [4] present a fingerprinting scheme for multimedia content which has it’s root from spread
spectrum embedding. They states that fingerprint in multimedia content must be placed in
appropriate place(must be significant related),enchantment in this leads to degradation in
image component. The presented scheme can withstand various signal processing attack as
well as collusion attack.
Wu et al. [8] provide forensic analysis for nonlinear collusion attack. Scheme enlighten
the detection scenario that can be improved by applying various preprocessing techniques
on the media content. The work mainly provides comparison between various non linear
attack and their detection strategy according to perceptual quality. Schonberg et al. [9]
presents digital fingerprinting problem as the analog hole problem. Scheme present a phase
shifted collusion resistant scheme. Analysis of collusion resistant for proposed scheme using
gradient attack is provided. Kim et al. [5] present a scenario for n-secure fingerprinted
code. The difference between the watermark and fingerprint along with generation of
robust collusion resistant fingerprint is given. Design of code is same for every user and
inserted in same position. Wang et al. [12] presents forensics for orthogonal modulation.
They also derived bound limits for number of colluder to robustness of collusion resistant
system. The maximum detector and thresholding detector is used for tracing the user.Lian
et al. [13] present collusion secure fingerprinting by applying modulation and modulation
technique.The scheme assumes distributor as server side to do modulation and user as client
side to do demodulation. Modulation is done at server side with pseudo random number and
demodulation at client side with fingerprinted code.The demodulation at client side provide
source of information that which part of content is being removed and new content is inserted.
Pinkas et al. [6] presented scheme have root from cryptographic scheme which interns
leads to colluder when there is large amount of sensitive data is colluded. Author present a
probable resilient scheme which is used when user decrypt content above certain threshold.
Tassa et al. [7] present scenario on dynamic traitor tracing . The work deals with bulk
transfer of content and states that there is rights for legitimate user to use the content to
ensure this access to the systemmust be conditional. Caronni et al. [10] present a scenario for
ownership management of digital image. The work shows the extent to which the fingerprint
embed in order to trace the colluder correctly. Karthik et al. [11] present digital right
management scenario by video fingerprinting and encryption. The main focus is on multi
cast communication by presenting a joint secure scheme with encryption and fingerprinting.
Wang et al. [14] provide a new tree structure detection strategies. They also presents the limit
for correlation among the user to identify colluder and give the coded modulation techniques
to provide the novel ACC which has property that composition of two or more ACC is
unique. The AND code is suitable for antipodal form of fingerprints. Barg et al. [15] present
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the codes ensure tracing of at least one colluder if collusion occur in the system. The tracing
probability of at least one user is exp( !(n)) for coalition of size-t. They also ensures
that code generation complexity is polynomial time of number of user.Another method for
fingerprinting multimedia data, video, audio presents by [16]. The generated fingerprint
are Gaussian random vector. They states that the placement of fingerprint also must be
significant so that modification in this portion leads to the destruction of multimedia content.
The work also states that placing the fingerprint in particular region makes the fingerprinted
copies robust in nature to withstand against the general distortion as well as collusion attack.
Manaf et al. [17] present the framework for collusion resistant in video which focuses
on copyright protection. The proposed scheme process video content by frame. The scheme
uses block coding along with truncation ,wavelet transformation and decompose the singular
value to achieve the robustness and quality. As processing and fingerprint generation is
done for each frame so it is computationally hard for attacker to detect the fingerprints.
He et al. [18] provide video fingerprint for bulk transfer with collusion resistant property.
The work consider the real world problem deals with distribution of content TV or DVD
which has significantly large number of user in range of 100 million. So this large set of
user has highly efficient CRF which has not only have high collusion resistibility but also
less computational complexity for tracing and generation complexity for fingerprint. They
proposes a mechanism considering both encoding and embedding for coded fingerprint.
They shows that coded fingerprint has high detection capacity while lack in resistibility.
Kirovski et al. [27] presents the collusion attack problem as ’analog hole problem’. The
analog hole problem states that traditional cryptographic scheme such as encryption can’t
apply for protection of multimedia content. The work explore the issue and the solution
to proposed problem along with analysis of various classes of spread spectrum embedding
namely direct ,uniform and bounded Gaussian distribution. Kuribayashi et al. [19] propose
a fingerprinting scheme based on Code Detection Multiple Access Technique (CDMA).
The fingerprint generation fallows DCT transform along with pseudo noise sequence. A
hierarchical manner is fallowed for increasing the number of fingerprinted code. The
fingerprints are made up of group number and user number. For detection of colluder FDCT
algorithm is used which significantly reduces the detection complexity. Schaathun et al.
[30] presents the counter attack to the [19]. The author claims that the scheme is susceptible
to non-linear collusion attack. The author defines two novel attack using conventional
attack that is moderated minority extreme attack,the attack is limiting function of minimum
and maximum attack and uniform attack,perform attack at regular interval of range and is
combination of maximum and midpoint attack. Hernandez et al. [20] test the effectiveness
of [19]. They check the robustness of scheme against collusion attack along with perceptual
transparency for scheme. They investigate the scheme by giving upper bound of distortion
for fingerprints. Results shows that scheme suited well for real world application belongs to
restricted distribution of content.
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Cha et al. [21] proposes scheme against time varying collusion attack. They proposed
the MC-CDMA system and gives scheme to improve the efficiency of system. The work
focuses on audio signal proceeds bymaking of auditory system based on characterization and
noticeable difference. They provide advance detector and interleaving coding as solution
to problem of collusion attack. The work discuss interference in collusion attack and
also focuses on dynamics of same. Qureshi et al. [22] provide a framework for content
distribution for preserving security and privacy which focuses on peer to peer network. The
end user is private in network whereas the merchant owns copyright law so that a strong
copyright mechanism must be employed in the system that deals with both privacy issue
and copyright enforcement. The framework ensures colluder tracing,buyer authenticity and
collusion resistant.
Zhao et al. [23] presented various statistical measures related to linear and nonlinear
collusion attack. They work is solely based on independent fingerprint. They also gives
the importance of perceptual quality and collusion resistant of fingerprint. The work also
suggest bounding the Gaussian fingerprint as a solution to improve the quality and lower
the distortion of generated fingerprinted content along with covenant between the collusion
attack and quality of output fingerprinted content. Li et al. [24] gives comparison for various
linear and non-linear attack in embedding and non-embedding domain. The work provide
model of collusion attack from the owner and colluder point of view as the owner deals with
certain component of content whereas the colluder deals the component as whole so two
different model are required. They also discuss the covenant between the image quality and
collusion attack. [1] presents a novel attack on multimedia known as Linear Combination
Of Collusion attack(LCCA),a generic average attack. LCCA generate the colluded copy of
good quality along with hardening the tracing for system. The work check the strength of
AND-ACC code presnted by Trappe et al. [3] ,who claims that AND-ACC can resist the
average collusion attack. However they shows that AND-ACC coded fingeprints can be
easily attacked with LCCA leaving no trace. Wang et al. [25] present various statistical
measures and analysis on non-linear collusion attack. The work solely based on orthogonal
Gaussian fingerprints. They suggest that unbounded Gaussian fingerprint have some kind of
distortion in the output content,whereas boundedGaussian fingerprint provide image of good
quality. Doerr et al. [26] presents the collusion attack on video using mosaicing,all video
are processed to have same constraint. The collusion attack here is intra video collusion
attack,which assumes watermarking video is the watermarking multiple still images. For
video if same watermark is applied to different frame then the collusion attack extract
watermark from images and subtract it to watermark content to get original content.Wu et al.
[28] presents a novel attack on watermarking scheme considering buyer authentication. The
buyer authentication scheme performmodification on certain pixels depending on secret key
information. The collusion attack present here is adaptive to situation in which the colluder
chooses certain pixel of output content and perform average on these pixel to remove the
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authentication information. Etesami et al. [29] proposes a collusion attack on fingerprints
generated from finite alphabet.The attack is non-linear in nature perform statistical operation
maximum and multiplication() on fingerprints. The work discuses the correctness of attack
for various random and deterministic schemes along with providing lower bound for number
of colluder. Li et al. [24] has also given same analysis for collusion attack using Gaussian
fingerprint. They proposes the two different attack model from owner and colluder point
of view. The two model are different in nature because colluder uses all component of
multimedia content to attack while owner uses only partial component. So for analyzing
collusion attack effectively it is mandatory to use different collusion attack model from that
of owner model for attack.
Zheng et al. [31] proposed modified traceable code scheme , which is Interleaving
embedding scheme(ILE). ILE scheme enforces the interleaving of various block of
fingerprint before embedding. ILE scheme increases the collusion resistive ability of codes.
They found that if every conspirator contribute same to the colluded content then colluder
identification will become more feasible. ILE scheme uses the same fact ,a hidden key is
used for permutation of interleaved fingerprints. He et al. [18] study the performance of
error correcting codes(ECC). The ECC are much more traceable code than resistive. The
study concern with both coding and embedding issue. They shown that average attack is
best attack to mount on independent fingerprint while in ECC it has no significant. Cheng
et al. [32] investigates collusion codes and various algorithm. The investigation carried out
for traditional AND-Anti collusion code(AND-ACC). They found that there exist various
other logical code which has better performance than AND-ACC. The new collusion code
logical Anti collusive code and various algorithm for detecting the collusion is obtain.Leung
et al. [33] proposed a robust embedding scheme for watermarking the image. The scheme
interns uses wave atom domain for embedding the mark into content. The scheme is based
on blind watermarking that is the watermark extraction does not need original content. The
comparative analysis between element gives the watermark. The original signal is divided
into five scale band signal out of which one is used to insert the mark.
Koubaa et al. [34] proposed the watermarking scheme for video which can
resist collusion attack along with several video processing attack. The scheme uses
mosaicing,which is creating a larger content from some small correlated content. Mosaicing
finds the area of interest in which the marking should be done. The scheme uses here finds
correlated area which interns embedded with same mark every time. The scheme lacks that
embedded mark can not be detect only it is inserted or not can be identified. Boroujerdizadeh
et al. [35] proposes a method which diminishes the occurrence of attack in watermark. The
work is related to video watermarking. The scheme is based upon conventional method
used in cryptography which is key management. They assume that collusion attack arises by
exchanging the files between the user,so that roper key management can reduce the problem
of collusion. The assume that to fully eliminate the attack one key for every user is used
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in the system. Tirkel et al. [36] proposes the fingerprinting scheme for audio which resist
the collusion. The audio signal must be protected with fingerprints as the transceivers may
drop some signal which intern used by the colluder. A vector space is formed with the
help of principal component. The fingerprints are assumed as rotation in that space in
ordered manner. The rotation is represented with sequence of related properties. These
related sequence array are inserted into audio which are collusion resistive. Maity et al.
[37] proposes a optimization in spread spectrum watermarking which interns resist fading
like collusion. The framework is based on genetic algorithm which uses wavelet domains.
The wavelet decomposition is multiband in nature is assets for space and energy. The use of
M-bandmakes the scheme robust against fading. The genetic algorithm are used to generates
the watermark by selecting suitable threshold. The scheme used a function based on original
content ,robustness and embedding imperceptibility.
2.4 Problem Formulation
There are N user for collusion resistant multimedia system with multimedia content is
represented by M has length N. The system generates a unique fingerprint f (i) also of length
N for each user u(i) where i = 1; 2; 3:::N . The thesis used coded modulation for fingerprint
generation so the generated fingerprint for N user fW (i)gNi=1 has correlation between them.
The fingerprinted multimedia content Y (i) is distributed to user.
The fingerprint embedding mechanism used here is robust embedding using wave
atom[33]. So the based on [33] multiple description coding is used for multimedia content
before embedding the fingerprint . So the content M is divided into four equal sub block
upper and lower even odd blocks.
The content M has size N N . The sub block generation are as fallows-
M1 = M(i; 2j   1),M2 = M(i; 2j)
M3 = M(N
2
+ i; 2j   1),M4 = M(N
2
+ i; 2j)
where M1;M2;M3;M4 are the sub block for upper and lower even odd description of
multimedia content M and i = 1; 2; 3:::N/2 ,j = 1; 2; 3:::N/2.
The fingerprint for the various sub block is represented by Y.The generation fallows the
equation
Y
(i)
k = M
j
k + f
(i)
k (2.1)
.
where Y (i)k , M
j
k , f
(i)
k are the kth component of fingeprinted content , kth subblock of
content M and fingeprints.
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2.4.1 Collusion Attack on Multimedia
It involves multiple user to combine there unique copy of fingerprinted image and generate
an illegitimate copy of unique fingerprinted image by applying some statistical method. CA
can be merely divided on basis of nature of statistical operation as Linear and Non Linear
collusion attack.
Assume that out of N user C are colluder with colluder set Cs = fci1 ; ci2 ; ci3 :::cicg. The
collusion attack involve C different copies of fingerprinted content fC(i)gNi=1 to generate a
colluded copy with kth component as Sk.
Attack Model:-
Sk = C(Y
(i)
k ) (2.2)
where C(.) is a collusion function. The attackmodel for various attack takes fingerprinted
copy as input and generates colluded content as output.
Linear collusion attack involves group of colluder with their individual copies of media
and they linearly(such as averaging ) combine to produce the colluded copy of media. The
linear operation are like summation and averaging are performed on group of media.
Linear Collusion Attack:
Sakvr = g(
Y
(i)
k
C
) (2.3)
where g(.) is a linear operation like average or linear combination of average. SavrK
is colluded copy generate by C colluder under average attack and Y (i)k is kth component
fingerprinted copy for ith colluder belong to colluder set Cs
Nonlinear collusion attack differs from linear collusion attack in manner of operation
performed on media. Attack perform some nonlinear operation(such as maximum,
minimum, median) on the media copies of colluder to generate illegitimate copy of media
content.
NLCA are more computationally expensive than linear counterpart in a manner as they
require more complex operation on such as comparison for finding maximum and minimum
among the media. So LCA attack can be executed more easily is one of the possible reason
for popularity and frequently use of LCA.
LCA has one more advantage for colluder over NLCA is that they are less traceable.
LCA are less traceable because group of colluder contributed to same extent in generation of
colluded copies and linear operation (averaging) also reduces the power of each legitimate
fingerprinted copies of media in colluded copy of media. So the LCA can be executed
more efficiently if the number of user involve in collusion is high as there is less trace for
individuals fingerprints.
System Model equation for Non Linear Collusion Attack are -
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Non Linear Collusion Attack:
Sakvr = g(
Y
(i)
k
C
) (2.4)
where g(.) is a non linear operation like minimum,maximum,median etc.If operation
is minimum then it is minimum non linear collusion attack,if maximum ,medium then it
is maximum ,median collusion attack respectively. SavrK is colluded copy generate by C
colluder under average attack and Y (i)k is kth component fingerprinted copy for ith colluder
belong to colluder set Cs
2.4.2 Performance Measure
The fallowing perform measure are used here to analyze the effectiveness of system.
Perceptual Qualitymeasure the quality for generated fingerprinted multimedia content.
The common measure used for generated content are mean square error(MSE) and peek
signal to noise ratio(PSNR). But MSE measure has some weakness as it does not account
some quality of image also MSE take noise distortion in content as whole does not
consideration noise for each component.
So to measure perceptual quality [23] provide an additional measure which is just
noticeable difference(JND). The JND can be used as thresold for distortion of content. If
the distortion in data values of content is less than JND then there will be not a significant
distortion for content.
They define two criteria measure using JND ar as fallow -
• Noise component that exceeds the JND
Njnd 
NX
j=1
M(noj>jndj)/N ; (2.5)
• Modified mean square value is
MSEjnd 
NX
j=1
no02j (2.6)
where no0j is as fallow8>>><>>>:
noj + jndj; if noj <  jndj;
0; if   jndj  noj < jndj;
noj + jndj; if noj < jndj;
(2.7)
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A very high value of these measure indicate that the generated fingerprinted image is not
of certain standard.
Collusion Attack And Detcetion Effectiveness The performance measure of system
model depends upon the success of mounting collusion attack and then tracing the colluder
in the system. The mounting success of collusion attack and tracing success of colluder
depends upon various criteria according to application. Among the various criteria the most
effective criteria are false positive and false negative. False positive here implies tracing to
legitimate user and assume it as colluder. False negative criteria is tracing to colluder and
ignoring it likewise legitimate user. The measuring for these criteria are-
• Pdoc:Probability of detecting at least one colluder.
• Pfoc: false positive probability of system that is falsely detecting at least one colluder.
• Nac: Number of actual colluder in system.
• Nfn: False positive fraction of user in system that is number of user that are detected
falsely by the system.
These criteria serve as basic for effectiveness of collusion resistant system and which
measure is taken into consideration depends upon application domain. Some application
make high priority to capturing colluder irrespective of capturing innocent colluder ,for these
types of system Pdoc and Pfoc are useful. On other hand application where false accusing is
crime take Nac and Nfn into consideration.
2.4.3 Solution to Collusion Attack Problem
Collusion attack become more feasible and cost effective attack in literature due to
advancement in Internet. The colluder can mount attack remotely on multimedia content
with its legitimate copy. The attack mounting can be done from any place, various colluder
involve in the system can contribute with their fingerprinted copy without being in same
place.Likewise generation, distribution of illegitimate content is also simple. The leads
to add serious issue to copyright protection. The collusion framework is the solution to
collusion attack problems.
Collusion resistant framework employed in the system to withstand against the collusion
attack. The System comprises mainly digital fingerprinting and embedding mechanism. The
most commonly used digital fingerprinting mechanism in the literature are orthogonal or
independent fingerprint and coded fingerprints.
The orthogonal fingerprints are computationally inexpensive and can generate fingerprint
easily as its counterpart coded fingerprint but suitable for small group of user as limited with
dimension of code used. So for large number of user coded fingerprint are suitable as they
offer some means of correlation between generated fingerprint.
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The design of collusion resistant framework differs from non collusion resistant
framework. CRF are design in such manner that the colluded copy leads to colluder involve
in collusion. The detail of collusion resistant framework is described in Section 2.2. The
tracing capability of CRF depends upon the fingerprint generation and assumption made to
choose the code.
(a) Non Collusion Resistant Framework
(b) Collusion Resistant Framework
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Non Collusive and Collusive Framework
Figure 2.2a and 2.2b shows the scenario of using non collusion and collusion resistant
framework respectively.
Figure 2.2a shows the of using non collusion resistant framework in which a colluder
generate colluded copy and be intractable by the system. Figure shows the system generates
fingerprinted copy (for simplicity only four copies are generated) out of which three user take
participation in collusion to generate colluded copy but due to system framework colluder
can’t be trace out.
Figure 2.2b shows counter scenario for collusion resistant framework in which system
framework is design in such manner that colluded copy leads to colluder. The same three
colluder involve in collusion and generate the colluded copy. The system use the colluded
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copy to trace back the conspirator.
The tracing capability of system depends upon types of fingerprinting generation
mechanism employed. For orthogonal fingerprint it can only trace one user at a time. For
coded modulation it depends upon type of base code used for fingerprint construction.
2.5 Conclusion
The chapter discussion starts with a brief overview collusion resistant system. Also the
preexisted related work is given as reference to the CRS. The problem structure is also given
in details along with the the some performance measure criteria to measure effectiveness
of system. The chapter ends with providing solution to collusion attack problem. The next
chapter deals with the analysis of different collusion attack in different domains.
Chapter 3
Analysis of Collusion Attacks
3.1 Introduction
Collusion attack very destructive and efficient attack, from colluder point of view, involve
a group of user to contribute their individual and legitimate copy of multimedia content,
distribute by owner, to generate the colluded copy. Collusion attack significantly decrease
the energy signal for colluder involve in the system as it is difficult or nearly impossible to
trace back the colluder. Collusion attack mainly divided into two kind depending upon their
mode of operation on that is linear attack and non linear attack.
The analysis of different kind of attack in different domain serve as a basis of designing
collusion resistant system. The chapter provide a detail analysis of linear and non-linear
attack in DCT, spatial and wavelet domain for coded fingerprint.The chapter start with
discussing statistical analysis for attack on coded fingerprinting system fallows by giving
image quality after different attack. In end, simulation result are given for domain analysis
of attack on coded fingerprint.
3.2 Collusion Attack
Collusion attack are mainly divided into linear and non-linear collusion attack. The
most popularly used linear collusion attack is average attack. The non linear attack
can be of different kind depending upon the operation performed on multimedia. The
various non linear operation include minimum,maximum,median,combination of minimum
maximum,combination of all there minimum,maximum and median attack,combination of
minimum and maximum with some probability.
Assume the original multimedia content vector is M has length N. There are L fingerprint
system denoted by ff (k)j gLj=1. The fingerprint generation fallows the equation
Y
(k)
j = Xk + f
(k)
j (3.1)
where the Y kj is kth component of fingerprinted copy distributed to jth user,  is experimental
22
Chapter 3 Analysis of Collusion Attacks
constant and f (k)j is kth component of fingerprint for jth user. The C out of N user are colluder
with the colluder set Cs = f1; 2; 3:::Cg.
3.2.1 Types of Collusion Attack
Linear Collusion Attack
They are the most widely used and effective attack for multimedia.The average attack is one
of the attack involve linear operation on the fingerprinted copy of content.
Average Attack:
Savri = (
X
iCs
Y
(k)
i
C
) (3.2)
Non-linear Collusion Attack
They can be of different type depending upon number of operation that can be performed on
content. The non linear collusion attack are as fallow-
Minimum Attack:
Smini = min(fY (i)k gkCs) (3.3)
Maximum Attack:
Smaxi = max(fY (i)k gkCs) (3.4)
Median Attack:
Smedi = median(fY (i)k gkCs) (3.5)
Minmax Attack:
Sminmaxi =
min(fY (i)k gkCs) +max(fY (i)k gkCs)
2
(3.6)
Modneg Attack:
Smodnegi = min(fY (i)k gkCs) +max(fY (i)k gkCs) median(fY (i)k gkCs) (3.7)
Randneg Attack:
Srndmnegi =
8<:mein(fY
(i)
k gkCs) with probabilty p
max(fY (i)k gkCs) with probabilty 1-p
(3.8)
where Savri ,Smini ,Smaxi ,Smedi ,Sminmaxi ,S
modneg
i , S
rndmneg
i are the colluded copy
generated form average attack,minimum attack,maximum attack ,minmax attack ,modneg
attack,rndmneg attack respectively. The function min(.),max(.),median(.) represent statics
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minimum,maximum and median operation. Y (i)k is the fingerprinted copy as per Equation
3.1. C is number of colluder with Cs as colluder set ,p is probability constant.
3.2.2 Owner Attack Model
It take consider for partial component is as fallow-
Average Attack:
Savri = (
X
iCs
Y
(k)
i
C
)
Minimum Attack:
Smini = min(fY (i)k gkCs)
Maximum Attack:
Smaxi = max(fY (i)k gkCs) (3.9)
Median Attack:
Smedi = median(fY (i)k gkCs)
Minmax Attack:
Sminmaxi =
min(fY (i)k gkCs) +max(fY (i)k gkCs)
2
Modneg Attack:
Smodnegi = min(fY (i)k gkCs) +max(fY (i)k gkCs) median(fY (i)k gkCs)
Randneg Attack:
Srndmnegi =
8<:min(fY
(i)
k gkCs) with probabilty p
max(fY (i)k gkCs) with probabilty 1-p
3.2.3 Colluder Attack Model
It consider the blind attack as colluder have no information about coefficient of multimedia
content so collude over all coefficient involve. So the model for colluder is as of owner with
slight changes are as fallow-
Average Attack:
Savri = (
X
iCs
Y (i; j)
C
)
Minimum Attack:
Smini = min(fY (i; j)gkCs)
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Maximum Attack:
Smaxi = max(fY (i; j)gkCs) (3.10)
Median Attack:
Smedi = median(fY (i; j)gkCs)
Minmax Attack:
Sminmaxi =
min(fY (i; j)gkCs) +max(fY (i; j)gkCs)
2
Modneg Attack:
Smodnegi = min(fY (i; j)gkCs) +max(fY (i; j)gkCs) median(fY (i; j)gkCs)
Randneg Attack:
Srndmnegi =
8<:min(fY (i; j)gkCs) with probabilty pmax(fY (i; j)gkCs) with probabilty 1-p
3.3 Embedding and Non-embedding Domain
The most of the literature assumes DCT domain as embedding domain and spatial ,wavelet
domain as non embedding domain. The domain differs in manner of transformation applied
on fingerprinted content.
• The embedding domain(DCT domain) perform discrete cosine transformation on
fingerprints fallowed by collusion attack
• The spatial domain perform DCT, IDCT on fingerprints fallowed by collusion attack.
• The wavelet transformation perform DWT operation alongwith DCT, IDCT
Figure 3.1: Collusion Attack in Embedding DCT Domain
Figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 shows the block diagram for collusion attack in different domains.
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Figure 3.2: Collusion Attack in Non-Embedding Spatial Domain
Figure 3.3: Collusion Attack in Non-Embedding Wavelet Domain
• Figure 3.1 shows the collusion attack on fingerprinted copy in embedding(DCT)
domain. The discrete cosine transformation(DCOT) is applied on the fingerprinted
copy of multimedia content which fallows collusion operation. The inverse discrete
cosine transformation(IDCOT) is also applied to revert back to content to its original
domain that will generate the colluded image.
• Figure 3.2 shows the collusion attack procedure in non-embedding(spatial
domain)domain. The attack added one extra DCOT operation from ??. The
fingerprinted image first operate with DCOT1 and IDCOT2 on which collusion is
perform which fallowed by DCOT2 for first IDCOT2 and IDCOT1 operation for
corresponding DCOT1 to revert back it to original domain which intern generates
original image. The subscript used here to show correspondence.
• Figure 3.3 shows the collusion attack procedure in non-embedding(wavelet
domain)domain. The procedure added one extra discrete wavelet operation(DWOT)
than spatial domain transformation. The process performDCOT1 ,IDCOT2,DWOT
operation on fingerprinted image in manner on which the collusion attack is performed
which fallowed IDWT ,DCOT2,IDCOT1 in manner to generates the colluded copy.
3.4 Statistical Analysis
The testing to collusion by owner and collusion attack by colluder differs in processing
as they both treats multimedia content differently. The owner only collude with partial
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component to check the effectives of system whereas colluder collude blindly with the
content. So to check the effectiveness of collusion attack both types of system model is
taken into consideration.
3.4.1 Collusion Attack Model
Suppose Yk is output fingerprinted content produce by equation
Y(k) = Xk + f(k) (3.11)
with colluder set Cs. So Yk to which operation C(.) is performed with kCs where C(.)
is collusion attack operation.
• Collusion Attack In Domains
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackDCOT = C(Yk) (3.12)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackspatial = DCOT (C(DOCT
 1(Yk))) (3.13)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackwavelet = DCOT (DWT 1C(DWT (DOCT 1(Yk))))
(3.14)
whereDCOT ,DCOT 1,DOWT ,DOWT 1 are discrete cosine transformation ,inverse
discrete cosine transformation,discrete wavelet transformation,inverse discrete wavelet
transformation respectively.
Some convention in operation is used for comparison of attack.
• AttackM>Attack N implies attackM is overperform to attack N in attacking the coded
fingerprint.
• Attack M Attack N implies attack M and attack N has similar effect in attacking the
coded fingerprint.
• Attack M=Attack N implies attack M and attack N has same effect in attacking the
coded fingerprint.
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3.4.2 Attack Performance in Different Domains
• Average Collusion Attack is linear operation.
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackaverageDCOT = A(Yk) (3.15)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackaveragespatial = DCOT (A(DOCT
 1(Yk)))
= DCOT (DCOT 1A(Yk))
= A(Yk) (3.16)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackaveragewavelet = DCOT (DWT 1A(DWT (DOCT
 1(Yk))))
= DCOT (DWT 1(DWT (DOCT 1A(Yk))))
= A(Yk) (3.17)
where CollusionAttackaverageDCOT ,CollusionAttack
average
spatial ,CollusionAttack
average
wavelet are
the average collusion attack in embedding(DCOT) domain,spatial domain,wavelet
domain.A(.) is the average operation on fingerprints. The Equation 3.16, 3.17 conclude
that average attack is domain independent.
CollusionAttackaverageDCOT = CollusionAttackaveragespatial = CollusionAttackaveragewavelet
(3.18)
• Random negation Attack is, combination of minimum and maximum attack, non
linear operation. The attack has dual behavior for let p probability it is maximum
attack and (1-p) it is minimum attack.
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackrndmnegDCOT = R(Yk) (3.19)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackrndmnegspatial = DCOT (R(DOCT
 1(Yk))) (3.20)
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– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackrndmnegwavelet = DCOT (DWT 1R(DWT (DOCT
 1(Yk))))
(3.21)
where CollusionAttackrndmnegDCOT ,CollusionAttack
rndmneg
spatial ,CollusionAttack
rndmneg
wavelet
are the average collusion attack in embedding(DCOT) domain,spatial domain,wavelet
domain.R(.) is the random negation operation on fingerprints.
• Minimum Collusion Attack is non linear operation.
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackminimumDCOT = Min(Yk) (3.22)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackmimimumspatial = DCOT (Min(DOCT
 1(Yk)))
< DCOT (DCOT 1Min(Yk))
= Min(Yk) (3.23)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackminimumwavelet = DCOT (DWT 1Min(DWT (DOCT
 1(Yk))))
< DCOT (DWT 1(DWT (DOCT 1Min(Yk))))
= Min(Yk) (3.24)
whereCollusionAttackminimumDCOT ,CollusionAttackminimumspatial ,CollusionAttackminimumwavelet
are the minimum collusion attack in embedding(DCOT) domain,spatial
domain,wavelet domain.Min(.) is the minimum operation on fingerprints. The
Equation 3.23,3.24 conclude that minimum attack perform differently in different
domains.
CollusionAttackminimumDCOT > CollusionAttackminimumspatial > CollusionAttackminimumwavelet
(3.25)
• Maximum Collusion Attack is non linear operation.
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackmaximumDCOT = Max(Yk) (3.26)
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– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackmaximumspatial = DCOT (Max(DOCT
 1(Yk)))
< DCOT (DCOT 1Max(Yk))
= Max(Yk) (3.27)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackmaximumwavelet = DCOT (DWT 1Max(DWT (DOCT
 1(Yk))))
< DCOT (DWT 1(DWT (DOCT 1Max(Yk))))
= Max(Yk) (3.28)
whereCollusionAttackmaximumDCOT ,CollusionAttackmaximumspatial ,CollusionAttackmaximumwavelet
are the minimum collusion attack in embedding(DCOT) domain,spatial
domain,wavelet domain.Max(.) is the maximum operation on fingerprints. The
Equation 3.27,3.28 conclude that maximum attack perform differently in different
domains.
• Maxmin Collusion Attack is ,average operation perform over minimum and
maximum attack,non linear operation.
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackmaxminDCOT = Maxmin(Yk) (3.29)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackmaxminspatial = DCOT (Maxmin(DOCT
 1(Yk)))
< DCOT (DCOT 1Maxmin(Yk))
= Maxmin(Yk) (3.30)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackmaximumwavelet = DCOT (DWT 1Maxmin(DWT (DOCT
 1(Yk))))
< DCOT (DWT 1(DWT (DOCT 1Maxmin(Yk))))
= Maxmin(Yk) (3.31)
where CollusionAttackmaxminDCOT ,CollusionAttackmaxminspatial ,CollusionAttackmaxminwavelet
are the maxmin collusion attack in embedding(DCOT) domain,spatial domain,wavelet
domain.Maxmin(.) is the maximum minimum attack perform on fingerprints. The
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Equation 3.30,3.31 conclude that maximum attack perform differently in different
domains.
CollusionAttackmaxminDCOT > CollusionAttackmaxminspatial > CollusionAttackmaxminwavelet
(3.32)
As random negation attack is combination of minimum and maximum attack ,so
Equation 3.23,3.24,3.27,3.28 conclude that random negation attack also has the same
performance as the minimum and maximum attack in different domains.
CollusionAttackrndmnegDCOT > CollusionAttackrndmnegspatial > CollusionAttackrndmnegwavelet
(3.33)
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• Median Attack is ,perform median operation on fingerprints,non linear attack
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackmedianDCOT = Med(Yk) (3.34)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackmedianspatial = DCOT (Med(DOCT
 1(Yk)))
 DCOT ((DOCT 1Med(Yk)))
= (Yk) (3.35)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackmedianwavelet = DCOT (DWT 1Med(DWT (DOCT
 1(Yk))))
 DCOT (DWT 1Med(DWT (DOCT 1(Yk))))
= (Yk) (3.36)
where CollusionAttackmedianDCOT ,CollusionAttackmedianspatial ,CollusionAttackmedianwavelet are
the median collusion attack in embedding(DCOT) domain,spatial domain,wavelet
domain.R(.) is the random negation operation on fingerprints.
• Modneg Collusion Attack is,combination of minimum ,maximum and median
operation , non linear operation.
– Embedding Domain(DCOT Domain)
CollusionAttackmdnegDCOT = Mdneg(Yk) (3.37)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Spatial Domain)
CollusionAttackmdnegspatial = DCOT (Mdneg(DOCT
 1(Yk)))
(3.38)
– Non-Embedding Domain(Wavelet Domain)
CollusionAttackmdnegwavelet = DCOT (DWT 1mdneg(DWT (DOCT
 1(Yk))))
(3.39)
where CollusionAttackmdnegDCOT ,CollusionAttack
mdneg
spatial,CollusionAttack
mdneg
wavelet are
the mdneg collusion attack in embedding(DCOT) domain,spatial domain,wavelet
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domain.mdneg(.) is the modeneg attack on fingerprints. The Equation
3.27,3.28,3.23,3.24,3.35,3.36 conclude that minimum attack perform differently in
different domains.
CollusionAttackminimumDCOT > CollusionAttackminimumspatial > CollusionAttackminimumwavelet
(3.40)
3.5 Conclusion
The chapter focuses on behavior of different literature attack in different embedding and
non-embedding domains.Depending upon behavior in domains attack can be divided into
three classes. Class-1 have attack which have same effect in different domains. Class-2
have attack with approx same performance in different domains. Class-3 have descending
performance in different domains. Class-1 attacks are average attack whereas class-2 attacks
are median, maxmin and modneg. Class-3 attacks are minimum, maximum and randneg.
Various statistical are driven to prove the correctness of attacks behavior.
Chapter 4
Collusion Resistant Framework with
Wave Atom Embedding
4.1 Introduction
Advances in technology comes at cost. The most common example of this is copyright
management. The multimedia content over Internet can be attacked and distributed easily
as the user can take part remotely. A user can forge multimedia content and redistribute
it breaching the copyright law. The most common solution of this is collusion resistant
framework. The framework consist of different blocks to resist or detect the illegal
distribution.
The chapter focuses on defining proposed collusion resistant framework and also discuss
the effectiveness of framework. The framework uses error correcting code as base code for
fingerprint generation and wave atom transform domain for fingerprint embedding. The
main aim of framework is to provide optimal solution to collusion resistant problem.
4.2 Proposed Collusion Resistant Framework
The collusion resistive system proposed here has stem from coded fingerprinting. The
coded fingerprint has less collusion resistant whereas high tracing capability. To increase
the resistance of framework interleaving embedding scheme [33] used here which intern
uses ECC code based on reed solomon code. The framework overcome issues that are
existing literature framework. The traditional framework uses orthogonal fingerprints along
with spread spectrum embedding. The orthogonal fingerprints has dimensional dependency
problem along with it can be easily attacked with various attack[1].
The proposed framework overcome these problem by using modified ECC coded
fingerprinting mechanism [33] to generate the fingerprints. The framework uses wave atom
embedding [32] for embedding the fingerprints.
Figure 4.1a and 4.1b shows the comparative analysis of framework used in literature and
proposed framework.
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(a) Conventional Collusion Resistive
Framework (b) Proposed Collusion Resistive Framework
Figure 4.1: Comparison between Proposed and traditional approach
Figure 4.1a shows the block diagram for conventional framework shows that multimedia
content is embedded with spread spectrum embedding along with orthogonal fingerprinting
mechanism is used for fingerprint generation.
Figure 4.1b shows the block diagram for proposed framework shows that instead of
independent fingerprint we use ECC fingerprinting along with robust wave atom embedding
to generates the fingerprinted content.
4.2.1 Modified ECC Fingerprinting Mechanism
The ECC fingerprinting mechanism used here is interleaving ECC fingerprint generation
which has its stems in block interleaving. The process fallows division of fingerprints into
blocks and interchanging them before embedding.
Suppose that generated fingerprints has matrix F = [fjk]LNj such that each element
in original fingerprinted are consider as row by row by as interleaving the elements are
interleaved and inserted as column by column. The matrix has depth of interleaving Nj ,and
in original matrix the fjk is jth element of wave atom embedding for kth user’s codeword
symbol and after interleaving the user corresponding element is [(k   1)L+ j]. Fingerprint
for modified scheme are generated as fallow:
1. Base Code are generated with ECC code generation which fallow Reed-Solomon code
over Galois field.
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2. The code is divided into sub-blocks.
3. The sub-blocks are rearranged based on secret key.
4. The sub-blocks are combined to form large block.
4.2.2 ECC Fingerprints for Multimedia
The error correcting codes are traceable codes allows high degree for tracing the colluder.
The assumption for ECC fingerprints are that marks added by other are treated as error. The
hamming distance between the codewords of illegitimate user are much more such that it
will not be error. The hamming distance ensures that the matching codewords comes from
illegitimate user. The best matching set is denoted by descendant set.The traceable codes are
defined as fallows-
Definition: Let C PN be a code of length N with alphabet setP . The colluder set
is represented by Cs = fc1; c2; c3; :::ckg  C with length k which consist of N marks for
every colluder. The c1C consist of N marks with ci = fci1; ci2; ci3; :::; ciNg. The set which
has best hamming match with this set is known as descendant set is denoted by Ds(Cs) =
f(m1;m2;m3; :::;mN) : mj 2 fcij : 1  i  kg; 1  j  Ng. For colluder in descendant
(m1;m2;m3; :::;mN) 2 DS(Cs),for any colluder in colluder set ci 2 Cs such that mod j :
mj = c
(i)
j > mod j : mj = u(i)j for legitimate user set (u1; u2; u3; :::; uN) 2
P
/Cs,then
the codeword is k-traceability code.
The ECC fingerprint generation fallows reed-solomon code. The reed-solomon code are
based on some finite arithmetic field. Codes are linear in nature and stems from BCH codes.
Codes are represented with RS(l,m) with q-bit symbols and add parity symbols to make it
traceable. The code generated are of length l in which m data symbols are m with q-bit each
and rest are parity symbols. The code contains l-m parity blocks with q-bit. A Reed-Solomon
code can detect error equals to half of parity bits,so it is d-detectable where 2d = l-m.
4.3 Wave Atom Embedding
The framework proposed here uses wave atom embedding proposed by [33]. Leung
uses scheme based on blind watermarking, uses multiple descriptive coding. The scheme
intern transform the original multimedia content into wave atom transform domain before
embedding watermark. The same scheme is used here for fingerprint embedding with some
modification.
Figure 4.2 shows the fingerprint insertion and extraction process for proposed collusion
resistant framework. Owner insert the fingerprints into the content. The insertion process is
done in wave atom domain which is robust in nature than existing scheme. The fingerprint
insertion and extraction are opposite to each other. The suspicious content on receiving
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(a) Fingerprint insertion Procedure (b) Fingerprint Extraction Procedure
Figure 4.2: Proposed Collusion Resistive Framework
fallows the extraction procedure to check whether copy is colluded or not. On receiving
colluded copy mark of user is checked which has the best match is identified as colluder.
Figure 4.2a shows the insertion procedure for the proposed system.The step are a fallow-
1. Multimedia content is divided into subsegment using multiple descriptive coding.
Multiple Descriptive Coding: Suppose a multimedia content of size M N  N is
segmented into description as fallow-
M1(i; j) = M(i; 2j   1);M2(i; j) = M(i; 2j)
M3(i; j) = M(
N
2
+ i; 2j   1);M4(i; j) = M(N
2
+ i; 2j)
2. Divided subsegment are transformed into wave atom domain.
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Wave Atom Transform: Wave atom are replacement of 2-D wavelet which intern
obey the parabolic scaling law i.e. wavelength  (diameter)2 proposed by
Demnanet and Ying [38]. They shown that in wave atoms fingerprints has cover larger
space than in other traditional transform domain like curvelets or wavelets.
The elements of boundary of packets f i(x)gwhere x belong to real domain such that
x 2 R2, be wave atoms if there exist the constant SN
j ^ij  SN2 k(1 + 2 kj!   !i) N j+ SN2 k(1 + 2 kj! + !ij) N (4.1)
where j ij  SN2 k(1 + 2 kj!   !ij) N with N = 1; 2; 3::. The SN is constant
whose value depends upon environments. The cap over  denotes the discrete fourier
transform and the subscript i = (j; l1; l2; n1; n2) for a point (xu; wu) such that point
belongs to phase space- where
xu = (x1; x2)i = 2
 k; wu = (w1; w2)i = 2k(l1; l2): (4.2)
3. The coefficient Ci are being selected from the segment for which coefficient value is
larger than certain threshold t.
4. Certain modification is done on selected coefficient to make the system robust is as
fallow-
• Four constant a; b; c; d and threshold t1 is taken depending upon
environment.
• In I1; I2
– In I1;
if abs(Ci)  t1 then
Ci = Ci  a
else
Ci = Ci  b
end if
– In I2;
if abs(Ci)  t1 then
Ci = Ci  c
else
Ci = Ci  d
end if
• Similar procedure is fallowed for I3; I4
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5. Inverse transform is applied on segments to revert back them to original domain.
6. Apply reverse of multiple description coding to collect the four description.
Figure 4.2b shows extraction procedure for fingerprints. The extraction is reverse
process of insertion with some changes. The extraction for fingerprinted content is as fallow-
1. The division of content into multiple segment fallows same procedure as insertion.
2. The segments found are transformed into wave atom domain.
3. Coefficient are selected from the obtained subsegment.
4. The coefficient are compared in their even odd subsegment to obtain the fingerprints
fm are as fallow-
fm =
8<:1; mean(abs(I
(x)
1 )) > mean(abs(I
(x)
2 ))
0; mean(abs(I
(x)
1 ))  mean(abs(I(x)2 ))
where Ix1 and Ix2 are the elements from the odd and even subsegment. The half
fingerprint is generated with above step.
5. Similarly the second half of fingerprints is also generated.
4.4 System Design Process
The collusion resistant system some preprocessing before fingerprinting embedding. The
detailed system design process is given as fallow-
1. For a given multimedia signal determine the length B and the block size Bs. The
alphabet for system is given as a. Then the number of blocks in system N = B
Bs
2. Calculate the probability Pfon of identifying a wrong mark conspired by at least one
conspirator for each of blocks given under robust wave atom embedding.
3. The probability Pfoc for falsely detecting a mark is calculated by
Pfoc = 1  pfon
4. For an event where number of calculated mark areNcal is greater than a given number
n. The probability of such event E is Binomial distribution over Pfon.
Pr(E) = Pr(Ncal > n) =
i nX
N

N
i

P ifon(1  Pfon)N i (4.3)
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5. The probability of event for at least detecting at least one conspirator Pdoc fallows
conditional probability. The limit for Pdoc is
Pdoc > Pr(findminimumonecolluderjE)Pr(E) (4.4)
Where n = L-Le such that m-traceability code decides Le erasures. The probability for
detecting minimum one colluder for given event A is choose to 1. For probability of
identifying each colluder Pdall minimum requirement on which system is based ,it is
mandate to keep the Pdall is equal or less than event probability. The property of m-TA
code[40] has relationship in between which are based on erasures and probability
for detecting each colluder. For a given Pdall we can calculate m-TA properties like
maximum collusion persistence CPmax and codeword length to represent the userNc.
Similar computation can fallow to calculate the Pdall for given CPmax for m-TA code.
4.4.1 Problem Statement
The collusion resistive framework using coded fingerprints are more collusion traceable than
collusion resistance. To increase the collusion resistive capacity of framework interleaving
scheme is used in which the blocks of fingerprints are interchanged before they are inserted
into content.
The non blind detection reduces falsely accusing the user as colluder. The detection
procedure fallows extraction of marks and matching the each legitimate user original
fingerprints.
For a given user i ,
The Tn statics is-
Tn(i) =
(Yk  M)TCsj
;
i = 1; 2; 3:::Nu (4.5)
where Yk is extracted fingerprint for multimedia content M. The Csj is colluder set and
Nu is maximum user for the system can generates the fingeprint.
The collusion resistive capacity is the robustness of system against the conspirator attack.
The identification of colluder at max fallows Nu comparison that fallows Nu dimensional
codes. The resistive capacity statics for system can calculated by mean,variance and
covariance.
The mean-
Mean[Tn(i)] =
8<:[ 1a + (1  1a)]jjsjj; a 2 Csjjsjj; a /2 Cs (4.6)
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The Variance-
V ariance[Tn(i)] =
8<:[a+ 1 + (a  1)]
2s
c2
+ 2n; i 2 Cs
(1 + )
2
s
c
+ 2n; j /2 Cs
(4.7)
Covariance
covariance[Tn(i1); Tn(i2)] = 
2
n; n1 6= n2 (4.8)
 is correlation average of two marks. For two user i,j average correlation can be given
by
ij =
Cs(i)
TCs(j)
jjsjj 
N  D
D
where N is code length of Reed-Solomon code with minimum distance D.
In traditional ECC coded fingerprints interleaving attack can be mount by conspirator
using detailed comparison and analysis. In modified interleaving ECC code fingerprints
significant comparison and analysis is tough as the marks are firstly subdivided into various
blocks  and a permutation among these block is applied before embedding.
4.4.2 Simulation Parameters
Effectiveness of proposed system uses vast amount of parameters.They are as fallow-
• Interleaving Units:Number of blocks in which fingerprints are divided. Interleaving
operation is performed on the blocks before embedding.
• Watermark To Noise Ratio:Ratio of fingerprints and noise in the output image.
WatermarkToNoiseRatio(WNR) =
Yk
Noise
where Yk is fingerprints for kth user.
• Quality Factor:Measure of Image quality degradation during compression process.
4.4.3 Detection Strategies
The main goal of collusion resistive framework is to detect collusion and trace back at least
one colluder. The tracing finds the colluder by closely matching the mark to the user. The
user with higher correlation is declare as colluder. The detection strategy is as fallow:
1. The wave atom embedding with multiple description [31] allows blind detection
because fingerprint can be extracted by comparing the sub blocks.
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2. Extracted fingerprint is decoded with ECC decoding algorithm to generate the base
code sequence.
3. Comparison is done for extracted sequence with distributed sequence.
4. The user has most matched sequence is identified as colluder.
Various detection strategies are presented in [9], [18] are non-blind detection strategies
uses soft and hard detection. As the scheme presented here is blind so these strategies will
directly not applicable here.
Detection For Interleaving Attack:Attack involve segmented copies of every colluder
to generate the new copy of content. Detection involve extracting the fingerprint and
matching it with every fingerprint distributed. The match identify a user as colluder with
highest match.
Assume that out of N user C are colluder with colluder set Cs = fci1 ; ci2 ; ci3 :::cicg. The
collusion attack involve C different copies of fingerprinted content fC(i)gNi=1 to generate a
colluded copy with kth component as Sk. Let Fk is extracted fingerprint for kth user.
[18] defines two Gaussian variable for F1; F2 which have maximum value for colluder
and non-colluder set.
F1 = maxj2CsFk; F2 = maxj /2CsFk (4.9)
So the mean and variance for F1; F2 are as fallow:
mF1
= E[F1] = jjN jj
L

L
c
+
5(c  1(L D))
12

;
2F1
= V ar[F1] = jjN jj
L
2c + 
2
d
(4.10)
mF2
= E[F2] = jjN jj
L
 (L D) + 1
2
;
2F2
= V ar[F2] = jjN jj
L
2m + 
2
d
(4.11)
2m =

(c (L D)  1)
6
2
;
2d =

5 (c  1) (L D)
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2 (4.12)
where L is codeword lengthD = L  t+1 is minimum distance,c is number of colluder.
2d is additive noise variance.
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The probability of detection is:
Pd = Pr(F1 > F2) =
+1Z
 1
P (F1 > th)FF2(t)dt (4.13)
where FF2 is probability distribution function for F2 and th is certain threshold.
P (F1 > th) =  Q

th mF1
F1

(4.14)
Detection for Average Attack:Attack involve linear operation on copies of colluder.
The detection for average attack is as fallow: LetF1; F2; : : : ; Fc are the extracted fingerprints
from c colluder.Then-
F = [F1; F2; : : : ; Fu]
T
 N

[m1;m2]
T ; 2d
X
;
where
m1 = jjF jj

1
c
+

1  1
c



1c;
m2 = jjF jj1N c
(4.15)
where jjsjj is fingerprint strength 1l is a vector of l by 1 with all 1’s.
P
is N N matrix
whose all elements are  ’s except diagonal element which are 1. m1 is mean for colluder
andm2 is mean for non colluder.
4.5 Conclusion
The chapter presents the collusion resistive system framework for collusion attack. The
chapter discuss the ECC fingerprint generation andwave atom embeddingmethod alongwith
system design process. Various simulation parameters are given for system based on which
effectiveness of system is measured along with various detection strategies for attacks.
Chapter 5
Experimental Results and Discussion
Analysis of attacks is root for designing the optimized collusion resistance system. For
effectively designing the collusion resistive system it is necessary to know how different
attacks behave in different domains. The attacks of same category perform differently in
various domains. Chapter 3 presents the scenario and establish various statistical results for
same. This chapter presents the experimental result for various collusion attacks in different
domains. Depending upon these analysis a robust domain is chosen for efficient collusion
resistance system. The chapter also presents various results to show the effectiveness of
system.
5.1 Collusion Attacks Analysis
Collusion attack are effectively mount on the multimedia to generate the illegitimate copy.
Analysis of attacks in embedding and non-embedding domain is important to know the
behavior of attack and to design effective system. Here we presents the analysis of colluder
attack model in DCT, spatial, wavelet domain.
5.1.1 Simulation Results
The experiment here investigate the behavior of coded fingerprints in different domain uses
standard Lenna image as base image of size 512  512 uses error correcting code(ECC)
which uses reed solomon code RS(32,2) over Galois field GF(32). The 9 out of 15 randomly
selected fingerprints are selected randomly.
Figure 5.1- 5.6 shows the histogram of image generated in the domains.
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Figure 5.1: Average Collusion Attack in embedding and non-embedding domains
Figure 5.2: Minimum Collusion Attack in embedding and non-embedding domains
• Figure 5.1 shows the histogram of image generated after average collusion is perform
over fingerprinted image in domains. As histogram shows they are identical to each
other as derived by statistical analysis. Hence the simulation also shows that collusion
attack are domain independent.
• Figure 5.2 shows the histogram of image in domains after minimum attack. As
histogram are not identical and shows the ascending histogram peak implies minimum
attack in embedding(DCT) is most effective and non-embedding(wavelet) is least
effective.
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Figure 5.3: Maximum Collusion Attack in embedding and non-embedding domains
Figure 5.4: Maxmin Collusion Attack in embedding and non-embedding domains
• Figure 5.3 shows the maximum attack scenario in different domains. As the statistical
result shows that maximum attack in embedding(DCT) domain is most effective also
shown by histogram.Histogram for maximum attack in embedding (DCT) has lowest
peak shows effectiveness of attack whereas histogram in non-embedding(wavelet)
domain shows highest peak is least effective.
• Figure 5.4 shows the minmax attack scenario in different domains. As the statistical
result shows that minmax attack in embedding(DCT) domain is most effective also
shown by histogram. Histogram for minmax attack in embedding (DCT) has lowest
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Figure 5.5: Median Collusion Attack in embedding and non-embedding domains
Figure 5.6: Modneg Collusion Attack in embedding and non-embedding domains
peak shows effectiveness of attack whereas histogram in non-embedding(wavelet)
domain shows highest peak is least effective.
• Figure 5.5 shows the median attack scenario in different domains. As the statistical
result shows that median attack in different domain shows approx same behavior also
shown by histogram. Histogram for median attack in embedding (DCT) has almost
same histogram as in non-embedding domain.
• Modneg attack shows same behvior as median attack as it is the combination of
minimum ,maximum andmedian attack. Figure 5.6 shows themodneg attack scenario
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in different domains. As the statistical result shows that modneg attack in different
domain shows approx same behavior also shown by histogram. Histogram for median
attack in embedding (DCT) has almost same histogram as in non-embedding domain.
5.2 Proposed Collusion Resistive Framework
The proposed collusion resistance framework uses robust wave atom embedding and ECC
fingerprint generation with interleaving. Various results are drawn to show the effectiveness
of system as fallow:
5.2.1 Experimental Results
In this subsection, experimental conclusion ae made for the proposed fingerprinted system.
The effectiveness of system is measured by detection probability. The detection probability
of system is measure against the number of colluder in the system.
Table 5.1: Detection Probability for 200 interleaving units
Number Of Colluder Watermark to Noise Ratio(in db)
0 -5 -10 -15
10 1 1 1 0.9
20 1 1 1 0.76
30 1 1 0.89 0.55
40 1 1 0.70 0.45
50 1 0.92 0.50 0.35
60 1 0.85 0.53 0.25
Table 5.2: Detection Probability for 400 interleaving units
Number Of Colluder Watermark to Noise Ratio(in db)
0 -5 -10 -15
10 1 1 1 1
20 1 1 1 0.64
30 1 1 0.90 0.43
40 1 1 0.85 0.35
50 1 0.9 0.70 0.37
60 1 0.85 0.50 0.38
Table 5.1 and 5.2 showing the detection probability against number of colluder.The two
table differs in manner fingerprints generation.
Table 5.1 shows the result for system in which fingerprinting generation uses 200
interleaving units. The table significantly shows the result for mid-high watermark to
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noise(WNR) ratio. Results are drawn shows that system perform well for lowWNRwhereas
for high WNR it has low detection probability but perform well against the other existing
framework.
Table 5.2 detects the colluder for system with 400 interleaving units. The table showing
that it perform well for low WNR whereas for high WNR it detect the colluder with less
probability. For 400 interleaving units system perform well than existed system.
The collusion resistive system is tested against two standard multimedia image Lenna
and Baboon of size 512  512. The coded fingerprints are based on modified ECC coded
marks which is based upon Reed-Solomon code RS(30,2) over GF(32) with 200 interleaving
units. For Lenna image the number of embedded blocksNl = 37412, and length of sequence
is Ns = 1240 and for Baboon Nl = 87570 and Ns = 2919.
The various quality factor of image also set to check the effectiveness of system. The
detection probability of system is checked against quality factor with value 80,60,40 for
Lenna and 40,30,20 for Baboon. The quality factor for Lenna corresponds to WNR=1.02
db,-5.06 db,-8.20 db , the same for Baboon corresponds to -7.20 db ,-8.74 db ,-10.53 db. To
introduce noise in the system JPEG compression is applied
Various results are drawn for two sample images on the basis of quality factor and
watermark to noise ratio.
(a) Standard Lena Image (b) Fingerprinted Lena Image (c) Extracted Fingerprint
Figure 5.7: Framework Output for Lena Image
(a) Standard Baboon Image (b) Fingerprint Baboon Image (c) Extracted Fingerprint
Figure 5.8: Framework Output for Baboon Image
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Figure 5.7 and 5.8 shows the various image generated by the system.Figure 5.7 shows
the experiments on Lenna image. It shows the standard Lenna image and the fingerprinted
image for Lenna and finally the extracted fingerprint for standard image. Figure 5.8 shows
the same results for Baboon image.
Table 5.3: Detection Probability for Lenna Image under interleaving attack
Number Of Colluder Quality Factor(in db)
80 60 40
10 1 1 1
20 1 1 1
30 1 1 1
40 1 0.90 0.89
50 1 0.87 0.75
60 1 0.86 0.73
Table 5.4: Detection Probability for Lenna Image under Collusion attack with noise
Number Of Colluder Quality Factor(in db)
80 60 40
10 1 1 1
20 1 1 1
30 1 1 1
40 1 1 0.81
50 1 0.90 0.70
60 1 0.87 0.67
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 shows the experiments on Lenna Image. The detection probability for
the system is calculated as function of quality factor and number of colluder.
Table 5.3 shows the detection probability for colluder under interleaving attack. The table
shows that system performedwell for imagewith high quality factor whereas its performance
degrades under low quality factor. In spite of low quality factor system has high detection
capability for Lenna Image.
Table 5.4 shows the system probability for catching colluder under average attack. To
check the system effectiveness attack fallows image compression attack to introduce noise
in system. The system has high detection probability under collusion attack as well.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 shows the experiments on Baboon Image. The detection probability
for the system is calculated as function of quality factor and number of colluder.
Table 5.5 shows the detection probability for colluder under interleaving attack. The table
shows that system performedwell for imagewith high quality factor whereas its performance
degrades under low quality factor. In spite of low quality factor system has high detection
capability for Baboon Image.
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Table 5.5: Detection Probability for Baboon Image under interleaving attack
Number Of Colluder Quality Factor(in db)
40 30 20
10 1 1 1
20 1 1 1
30 1 1 1
40 1 1 0.92
50 1 1 0.80
60 1 0.90 0.60
Table 5.6: Detection Probability for Baboon Image under Collusion attack with noise
Number Of Colluder Quality Factor(in db)
80 60 40
10 1 1 1
20 1 1 1
30 1 1 0.93
40 1 1 0.90
50 1 1 0.73
60 1 0.98 0.70
Table 5.6 shows the system probability for catching colluder under average attack. To
check the system effectiveness attack fallows image compression attack to introduce noise
in system. The system has high detection probability under collusion attack as well.
Table 5.7: Comparison of fingerprint extraction and insertion
Fingerprinting Scheme Embedding Time(seconds) Extraction Time(seconds)
Leung et al.[33] 6.41 5.37
Tao et. al.[39] 0.9 9.45
Xaio et.al.[40] 6.22 2.31
Cheng et. al.[32] 2.43 0.32
Proposed Scheme 3.30 2.23
Table 5.7 shows the comparison results for various literature and proposed scheme. The
table shows the fingerprint embedding and extraction time for various scheme. The table
shows that the scheme has significant less insertion time than the existing schemes.The
system also outperform in extraction time except the Cheng et al. [32].
5.3 Discussion
Role of Multiple Description Coding(MDC):The multiple description is preprocessing
for framework to make it suitable for embedding . It divides the original content into sub
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blocks or description. There are two benefits of using MDC -(1)it simplifies the embedding
process as now the content to process is one fourth as before.(2)It allows Blind detection of
fingerprints[33].
Role of Wave Atom Embedding :The embedding domain make it hard for colluder to
extract the fingerprints. The wave atom transform domain is robust against variety of image
processing attack like removal of fingerprints[33].
Role of Interleaving ECC Coding:A ECC code is more traceble than collusion resistive,
but with modified ECC it is much more collusion restive for high watermark to noise ratio.
The interleaving applied on the sub block of fingerprints before applying it to content
according to certain key which makes it more collusion resistive[31].
5.4 Conclusion
The chapter present here various results for proposed collusion resistive framework and also
for analysis of different collusion attack. The results for collusion attacks justifies various
statistical results of chapter 3. The results of proposed framework proves the effectiveness
of system against two most popular attack.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis work, the problem of collusion attack over multimedia content has been
addressed. After a deep analysis of the already existing research work in this area, robust
wave atom embedding based collusion resistive framework has been proposed here in
order to resist the collusion attack. First, a detail analysis of various collusion attack in
different domains is provided which is basis of designing the effective collusion resistive
system. Here, analysis of attack in embedding and non-embedding domains is provided.
The embedding domain is mainly DCT domains whereas non-embedding domains are
wavelet and spatial domains. The framework presented here consider both fingerprint
generation and embedding. Fingerprints generation fallows ECC fingerprinting mechanism
along with interleaving and embedding fallows wave atom embedding. For the proposed
framework, it can be seen that it is highly collusion resistive . Fingerprint generation and
embedding guarantees both resistance and tracing in the system. The fingerprint embedding
mechanism for framework is quite robust in nature such that it can tackle with common
image processing attack to remove certain part of image.
While conducting the simulations, the results are limited to multimedia images. For
further research, an extension of proposed scheme to resist the collusion attacks in various
multimedia content should be taken into consideration. The insertion process time for
framework is also a point of interest in future.
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